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Abstract
The issue that this study focused upon was the legitimacy of military interventions
by a state against a violent non-state actor group located within another state’s territory.
The research sought to answer how interventions by the United States and its allies have
evolved during the post 9/11 era. It additionally explored if the justification for military
interventions had changed. This study used data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
and the United Nations Security Council to create a hybrid data-set and analyzed the data
for the location and number of states participating in operations against violent non-state
actors (“VNSAs”). This study also investigated consent and authorization issues. The
results demonstrate that interventions without consent are not significantly widespread as
to constitute a new international norm. The results also highlight that there more “trainand-assist” operations than the traditional “boots-on-the-ground” responses. The findings
demonstrate that the international community of states is the final arbiter of morality, and
that strategies grounded in deontological ethics are becoming more prevalent. Not only
is this compatible with Just War, it consolidates the notion of a rules based international
system. Finally, train-and-assist operations may prove far more financially sustainable
than traditional interventions.
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Part One
Introduction
Just War Theory (JWT) and state normative practice has predominantly been a
Western creation.1 Its purpose was not intended to abolish war but to reduce the number
of conflicts and the suffering associated with war. Just War centered on the circumstances
one state could legitimately go to war with another. It also informed as to how states
should conduct themselves while engaged in military conflict. However, the global
security environment has dramatically evolved from traditional interstate conflicts to
include threats posed by violent non-state actor (VNSA) groups located both locally and
within other sovereign states.2
Although each violent non-state actor is different, they share some similar traits in
that their emergence may serve as an alternative form of governance to the state.3 The
relationship between the state and the VNSA is usually one of hostility and it challenge
the monopoly on violence that is normally the domain of the state. 4 Some examples of
VNSAs include warlords, domestic and transnational criminal groups, gangs, and terrorist

1 T. Assad, “Thinking about Terrorism & Just War”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2010,
Vol.23 No.1, p.4.
2 M. Walzer, Arguing About War, Yale University Press,2004: N. Fotion, War and Ethics: a new just war
theory, Continuum International Publishing, 2007
3 P. Williams, Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security, International Security
Network- Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, 2008, pp. 6-8
4 Ibid
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organizations.5 The terrorist attacks of September 11th ignited debate if Just War Theory
can be applied to address the new types of threats.6

Addressing the Rise of Violent Non-State Actors

The overarching research problem is: How have the characteristics of the United
States and Allied responses to violent non-state actors (VNSAs) evolved since 9/11 and
how have the justifications for interventions changed? Accordingly, this project explores
how and when the U.S. and its allies have intervened against violent non-state actors in
the post 9/11 era. It also examines if these types of interventions are compatible with the
principles of Just War theory. While it may not be possible to answer the second issue in
its entirety, nonetheless it is important to explore due to the continued rise of violent nonstate actor organizations.
The issues are significant because there is some disagreement among scholars
and jurists as to when states are justified in using military intervention to manage the
national security challenges posed by VNSAs. There is not a complete picture as to where
and how these interventions are being conducted. Jus ad bellum -- the law governing the
right to wage war -- was originally premised on the notion that military interventions would

5 Ibid
6 N.C Crawford, “Just War Theory and the U.S Counterterror War” Perspectives in Politics, 2003, Vol.1
No.1, pp.5-25; D. Fisher, “Can a medieval just war theory address 21st century concerns” The Expository
Times, 2012, Vol.123 No.4, pp.157-165; N. Fotion , “Two Theories of Just War” Philosophia, 2006,
Vol.34, pp.53-64; H. Hill, “Can Just War Theory Survive the War on Terror” Journal of Justice and
International Studies, 2020, pp.77-87; E. Patterson, “Just War in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Just
War Theory after September 11th” International Politics, 2005, Vol.42, pp.116-134; M. Walzer, “Terrorism
and Just War”, Philosophia, 2006, Vol.34, pp.3-12
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fulfil a rightful intention to advance “good, or [an] avoidance of evil.” 7 The philosophical
issue over who gets to arbitrate what is “good or evil” has been long debated since the
times of Socrates and Plato.8 It also raises the “do unto others” maxim—what you do to
another with impunity on one occasion, may well be revisited upon you by some other in
the future.
In Nicaragua v. United States (1986), the International Court of Justice held that
interventions against VNSAs in other states without consent were illegal. The exception
to this was if a state had declared itself to have suffered an armed attacked, and that
VNSA was acting under the direction or being supported by the host state. 9 Illegal
interventions potentially place states who have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court10 in jeopardy of international legal proceedings for war crimes and
“crimes of aggression.”11 Foreign policy may also be dramatically impacted upon
negatively if partners and allies are uncertain as to the legality of actions taken in concert
with the United States—which has not ratified the Statute.
The results of this study will lend support to strengthen the notion of a rules-based
international order particularly considering China’s recent statement that it intends to
“regain its might and re-ascend to the top of the world.”12 Furthermore, if it is accepted

7 T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, circa 1265-1274, Art.1
8The Republic of Plato (2nd Ed) Book 1, Basic Books, 1991, translated with notes and an interpretive
essay by A. Bloom, pp.27-34
9 Nicaragua v. United States of America (1986) I.C.J 14, para.199
10The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
11 Ibid Arts. 5 and 8
12 Xinhua News Agency in Xi’s Key Milestone Positions Him to Rule China for Decades, Bloomberg
Politics, October 24, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-24/xi-s-new-milestonepositions-him-to-rule-china-for-decades-more
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that these types of interventions are an appropriate response by one state, then it follows
that similar interventions should be accepted as legitimate by any other state that chooses
to employ this strategy in future. It also raises the issue that if it is a legitimate response
to one type of violent non-state actor group, should it not be considered mandatory for all
types of VNSA including trans-national organized crime syndicates, pirates, and cartels?

Literature Review: Just War Theory and Violent Non-State Actors

Just War Theory has predominantly been a Western-Eurocentric creation.13 Its
purpose was not to abolish war but rather to establish rules to reduce the outbreak of
conflicts, and the suffering associated with war. The notion that violence could be “just”
or “moral” from a Western position first appeared in the writings of Saint Augustine in 400
A.D. Augustine noted that wars had been an ongoing feature throughout various periods
of civilization. Rather than attempting to outlaw war itself, he suggested that there could
be limits to when military conflicts between nations were permissible. He asserted that
war carried out in accordance with the will of God showed “not ferocity but obedience,
and God in giving the command, acted not in cruelty, but in righteous retribution...” 14 He
further went on to ask the question of “[w]hat is the evil [motivation] in war?” to which he
elucidated that cruelty, violence for its own sake, and seeking to usurp power unlawfully

13 Assad stated, “It is common knowledge that the concept of ‘just war’ has its roots in medieval
Christian theory…today the term…is about the use of international violence that is in fact necessary &
moral” He goes on to further add that “a widely regarded illegal act could be legitimized simply by
European states endorsing its intentions” Op Cit, p.4
14 A.H Augustinus, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, 400 A.D, Book 22,
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were all unjust reasons for conducting war. Additionally, Augustine explored the issue of
who could rightfully authorize military acts and concluded:

A great deal depends on the causes … and on the authority they have for
doing so; for the natural order which seeks the peace of mankind, ordains that
the monarch should have the power for undertaking war…and that the soldiers
should perform their military duties in behalf of the peace and safety of the
community. 15

The question of whether any war could be considered lawful, philosopher,
theologian, jurist, and later Saint Thomas Aquinas put forward that firstly, for an armed
conflict to be considered as legitimate, there had to be rightful sovereign authority (e.g.,
prince, monarch) to authorize acts of war.16 Secondly, there had to be a “just” cause.
Aquinas declared, a “just war is … one that avenges wrong, when a nation or state has
to be punished, for refusing to make amends for wrongs … or to restore what has been
unjustly seized.”17 Finally, he put forward the concept of rightful intention -- “the
advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.”

18

In 1625 jurist and political theorist Grotius published De Jure Belli ac Pacis which
consisted of three separate books devoted to jus ad bellum, customary practices, and jus
in bello. In this comprehensive work Grotius employed the philosophy of Natural Law,

15 Ibid
16 T. Aquinas, Op Cit, Art.1
17 Ibid
18 Ibid
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which Oxford Dictionary defines as “a body of unchanging moral principles that is
regarded as a basis for all human conduct.”19 This expanded Just War Theory from a
religious doctrine to a broader normative theory that elaborated on the concept of jus ad
bellum—the right to wage war.

Indeed, it may be asserted that Grotius could be

considered the “father” of what is recognized today as modern Just War Theory and public
international law.
Like his predecessors, Grotius examined the question on the lawfulness of war
itself. He concluded “so far from any thing (sic) in the principles of nature being repugnant
to war, every part of them indeed rather favours (sic) it.”

20

Additionally, he expanded

upon the notion of the authority of a sovereign power. Furthermore, Grotius distinguished
between the nature of public war and matters considered to be private dispute between
individuals.21
Grotius also elaborated on several other issues, including treaties and obligations
with respect to embassies. He asserted that “almost every page of history offers … the
inviolable rights of ambassadors and the security of their persons, a security sanctioned
by every clause of human and revealed law.”22 Grotius restated what he considered to be
‘unjust’ causes for war as put forward in the works of his predecessors. Furthermore, he
counselled against a rush to war even when a just cause was found to exist in what is
now considered the “last resort” principle of modern Just War Theory. 23

19 Oxford Dictionary Online
20 H. Grotius, De Jure Bellis ac Pacis, 1625
21 Ibid
22 Ibid
23 Ibid
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Lastly, Grotius contemplated the way in which a “just” war was to be conducted.
He introduced to the literature the proposition of jus in bello.24 This included the
moderation in laying waste to an enemy country, the humane treatment of prisoners and
hostages, and a respect for declared neutrality.25 Grotius’ scholarship laid the foundations
for codified international law, such as the Geneva Conventions and other conventions of
Just War. However, as with the previous foundational works by Aquinas and Augustine
the early literature is purely a discussion of ideas on what a ‘just’ war is.
Modern day scholarship on Just War Theory and the subsequent development of
the Law of War has proceeded upon the basis of a Christian-Western interpretation, and
accepted to be based on the following principles:
•

War can only be waged for a just cause, which may extend beyond the cause
of self-defense against an armed attack. Humanitarian intervention and preemptive war are also often considered just causes.

•

War can only be waged under legitimate authority. Usually the constitution and
the laws of a nation state specify the institutions and personnel authorized to
make war decisions. The U.N Charter authorizes the Security Council to make
the international community's war decisions.

•

War can only be waged with the right intention. Correcting a suffered wrong
is considered a right intention, but seeking material gain is not.

•

War can only be waged if there is a reasonable likelihood of success.

24 Ibid
25 Ibid
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•

War must be waged with proportionality in mind. The suffering which existed
pre-war should not be overshadowed by the suffering the war may cause.

•

War can only be waged as a last resort. War is not ‘just’ until all realistic options
which are likely to right the wrong have been pursued.26

These are not the only principles, others include: necessity of military action, humanity,
and honor.27 Once war has begun, Just War Theory also directs how combatants are to
act (jus in bello) during the conflict:
•

Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of discrimination or
distinction. The acts of war should be directed towards the inflictors of the
wrong, and not towards civilians caught in circumstances they did not create.
The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no
military target and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against ordinary
civilians.28

• Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. The
force used must be proportional to the wrong endured, and to the possible
good that may come. This includes attacks that might cause increased or
excessive incidental harm i.e. an increased level of collateral damage.29

26 U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 1.11.1, June 2015, Updated December,2016: Hill,
Op Cit, p.79
27 DoD War Manual, Ibid, Chap.2
28 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 51.2, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3
29 DoD War Manual, Op Cit, 2.4.2; Hill, Op Cit, p.79
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Just War Theory was originally state-centric with a predominant focus on how the
state is to act in its response to threats from other states.30 However, with the end of the
Cold War and the decline of traditional state-versus-state conflict, new threats emerged
as a challenge to international security and the theory. A number of scholars posited that
with the rise of non-state actor threats, Just War Theory was outdated and that a more
pragmatic approach was required.31 Others asserted that it did not need to be radically
reinterpreted, rather that there needed to be a reintegration and reinforcement of ‘virtue’
as originally espoused by Aquinas.32 With a distinction made between what has been
termed “new and old wars,” the theory has subsequently been reworked by some scholars
to include a new “Irregular” Just War Theory component.33
Irregular Just War Theory specifically considered asymmetric warfare which
Oxford Online defined as “warfare where a smaller or inferior force uses unexpected or
unconventional tactics against a larger or superior adversary.” 34 Irregular Just War Theory
also considered the rise of non-state actor violence such as insurgency and terrorism.35
Fotion asserted that one of the primary benefits of Irregular Just War Theory is that the
state is “given some slack to attack preventively,” which is not permitted under Regular
Just War.36 He maintained that if the intelligence indicated that a VNSA “has powerful

30 Walzer, 2004 Op Cit
31 Crawford Op Cit; Hill Op Cit; Patterson Op Cit
32 Fisher Op Cit, Walzer M, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 5 th
Edition, Basic Books, 2015, New York
33 Fotion 2007, Op Cit
34 Oxford Online Dictionary
35 Fotion, Ibid; M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2012
36 Fotion Ibid, p.117
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weapons, is in the process of collecting more weapons, is in the process of gaining new
recruits to its cause and has plans for a future violent event, then it can be attacked…even
if it has not initiated any attacks yet.”37 Another benefit afforded to the state is that the last
resort principle is “defunct,” particularly if the state is not aware of the existence of the
group until after an attack.38 However, Fotion issued the caveat that the use of Irregular
Just War principles should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.39
These “new wars” that are asymmetrical in nature raise other questions. The issue
of who is responsible for civilian deaths in urban based settings and how “should” an army
fight where insurgents and other VNSAs choose to fight in that environment has yet to be
conclusively settled.40 Additionally, it also highlights the problem of the use of civilians as
human shields.41 As Walzer asserted that if the number of civilian casualties is considered
excessive, then rightly or wrongly, the military will normally be held to blame in the court
of public opinion.42 Even more importantly the principle of “reasonable success” faces
close scrutiny. Under these built up urban conditions, is it possible that an army can be
victorious when it is committed to “just rules of engagement,” particularly where the nonstate actor does not feel bound to adhere to the established rules of armed conflict? 43

37 Ibid
38 Ibid, p.118
39 Ibid, p.117
40 Walzer, 2015 Op Cit, Preface, p. xxi
41 Walzer Ibid
42 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, arts. 51.5(b), 57.2(b), 57.3, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; See also
Walzer Ibid
43 Ibid, Preface, p. xx
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Another associated emerging practice --the Responsibility to Protect-- is directed
at legitimizing military action in a state that has become predatory towards its own
population either generally or against specifically targeted groups.44 Additionally, Scharf
has asserted that the “unwilling-and-unable doctrine” legitimized pre-emptive collective
self-defense against VNSA groups located in a third state.45 This doctrine posits that
“force can be justified where a government is unwilling or unable to suppress the threat
posed by the non-state actors operating within its borders.”46 While this may be a settled
doctrine from the U.S’ position, it is highly contestable because it violates other longstanding international customary law vis-a-vis non-intervention and state sovereignty.
Bethlehem has suggested that with “the inventing of new language … the United States
was moving away from … established tenets of international law.”47 Furthermore, it is in
stark contrast to the International Court of Justice’s ruling in Nicaragua v. United States
(1986).48 Finally, as was underscored in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda
(2005), even when consent is obtained “such operations must be limited and restricted
within the parameters of such consent.”49
A recent philosophical and moral contribution to the literature by Walzer is the
concept of non-violence and the theory of war -- a “war without weapons.”50 It is premised

44 It could be suggested that the Responsibility to Protect is very much aligned with Aquinas’ notions of
“advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil…”
45 M. Scharf, “How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law” Faculty Publications, 2016, Paper
1638 p. 52-53
46 Ibid, pp.3-4
47 Bethlehem in O. Gross, “Unresolved Legal Questions Concerning Operation Inherent Resolve” Texas
International Law Journal, 2017, Vol.52 No.2 p.21
48 Nicaragua v. U.S. (1986) Op Cit
49 Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (2005) I.C.J 116 at para 52 in Gross, Op Cit, p.16
50 Walzer 2015 Op Cit, p.329
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on the notion that allows for the conceding of a country or territory to an invading force
without any military resistance.51 It then falls to the civilian population to “deny the
victorious army the fruits of its victory through … civilian resistance and noncooperation….”52 There has been some debate as to its effectiveness and as yet there
are “no cases in which … civilian defense has caused an invader to withdraw. 53 However,
Walzer countered that:
…no non-violent struggle has ever been undertaken by a people trained in
advance in its methods and prepared …to accept its costs. So, it might be true;
and if it is, we should regard aggression very differently from the way we do at
present.54

While the concept of a non-violent resistance coupled with civil disobedience was in part
responsible for India gaining its independence from the British Empire, this was after India
had been colonized for 90 years. It is hard to envisage that a population would be
committed to remaining non-violent in the face of an invasion in this day and age.
Although violent non-state actors are not a new phenomenon within nation states,
their ability to disrupt the international system has increased exponentially since the end
of the Cold War. Some organizations have the financial and materials to rival their host,
and other states.55 While some may work in collusion with a host regime, many are

51 Ibid, pp.329-330
52 Ibid, p.330
53 Sharp in Walzer, Ibid
54 Walzer Ibid
55 Williams, Op Cit, p.4; It has been reported that drug cartels within Colombia allegedly had the third
largest ‘submarine’ fleet behind the U.S. and China. While they are non-weaponized and used for drug
smuggling activity, nonetheless they “tie up considerable resources” of the U.S and other countries – see
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involved in direct confrontation with the state and its security institutions. 56 Additionally,
VNSAs challenge the long-held Weberian concept that it is the state that holds the sole
monopoly on violence;57 however, Williams contended that the notion of state monopoly
over the “use of force is increasingly being reduced to a convenient fiction.”58
Furthermore, poor governance structures in already fragile states provides space
for some VNSAs to step in to provide services to communities that would otherwise be
the domain of the state. This can include local security, welfare, education, and local
economic opportunities.59 Rather than being an “ungoverned space” the territory
becomes an “alternatively governed” space.60 This in turn further weakens the legitimacy
of the state.61
Many violent non-state actor organizations may appear to share similar traits.
These include: a charismatic leader, “a sense of common purpose” for their members,
and an organizational structure ostensibly capable of achieving the group’s objectives. 62
However, there are also some notable differences. Some VNSAs have a hierarchal topdown structure, while others are more decentralized.63 Additionally, the “strength” of
organizations can vary between “local, national or transnational” influence.64

J. Arasli, “States Vs. Non-State Actors: Asymmetric Conflict and Challenges to Military Transformation”
Eurasia Review, March 13, 2011, http://www.eurasiareview.com/13032011-states-vs-non-state-actorsasymmetric-conflict-and-challenges-to-military-transformation/
56 Williams, Ibid, p.4
57 Ibid
58 Ibid
59 Ibid, pp.7-8
60 Ibid, p.6
61 Ibid
62 Ibid, p.7
63 Ibid, p.8
64 Ibid
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Violent non-state actor organizations can also have different motivations for their
use of violence. Terrorists use violence to create fear within a target demographic and to
disrupt the status quo. Their motivation is normally ideologically driven. However, the
gang, organized crime syndicate, or drug cartel’s motivation is financial, and violence is
used to achieve that objective or remove a rival or other threat. 65 While there may be
some nexus between criminal organizations and terrorist groups, it is more plausible that
terrorists become involved in other criminal activity to further their ideological goals.

Summarizing Knowledge Gaps

Modern scholarship has developed upon the basis of a Christian-Euro worldview.66
It does not consider other identities and traditions, nor does it consider what these
standards may look like from a non-Western perspective. Some Islamic scholars contend
that within Islamic culture the only ‘just’ war is a holy war (not to be confused with jihad)
and that:

The most widely accepted reasons of a ’just war’ are 1. Defense 2. Revolution
against tyranny and 3. Establishment of the Shar’iah. However, defensive war
in Islam can include: a) punitive wars against the enemies of Islam, b)
sympathetic war in support of the struggle of oppressed Muslims in foreign

65 Ibid
66 Assad Ibid
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lands, c) punitive war against rebels within an Islamic state, and d) an idealistic
war fought in order to command the good and prevent the commission of evil. 67

What may be thought to be “just” conduct in conflict in one society, may well be
perceived entirely different in another. For example, in Islamic Just War many of the
justifications such as to establish Shar’iah would not be considered a “just cause” by
Western interpretation.68 Additionally, it also raises the undiscussed issue of whether
some violent non-state actor groups could be proceeding completely in accordance with
their own culturally historic practices yet be considered by Western-led institutions and
conventions as “illegal.” By way of example, it may be argued that the Islamic State group
(ISIL) was acting in accordance with traditional Islamic scriptures and culture when they
enslaved the Yazidi population of Sinjar in 2014 the Islamic State (ISIL) said:
Their continual existence to this day is a matter that Muslims should question
as they will be asked about it on Judgment Day, considering that Allah had
revealed Āyat as-Sayf (the verse of the sword) over 1400 years ago. He ta’ālā
said, {And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the mushrikīn
wherever you find them, and capture them, and besiege them, and sit in wait
for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer,
and give zakah, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and
Merciful.} [At-Tawbah: 5] 69

67H. Legenhausen, “Islam and Just War Theory”, The Imam Khomeni Education and Research Institute,
Iran 2007, pp.14-15
68 Fotion 2007, Op Cit, p.113
69 “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour” Dabiq, October 2014, Iss.4, pp. 14-15
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While some maintain these interpretations to be a distortion, Ali asserted that slavery
did in fact have a place in Islamic scriptures as was the case with the histories of many
other religions and cultural practices prior to the imposition of Western modernity.70
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia maintained legal slavery practices as recently as 1962.71
The modern literature is predominantly qualitative in nature, with very little in the
way of quantitative studies to provide an empirical foundation. It is important to gain a
better understanding of where these interventions are occurring and how they are being
conducted. The typical project has focused on legal arguments, discussions, and
research by the way of cases studies into different theatres of conflict.72 This is particularly
true of the recent assertion that new customary law has developed vis-à-vis a state’s right
to intervene in another state that is “unwilling or unable” to address violent non-state actor
groups within its territory.73
The introduction of new issues related to asymmetrical conflicts being conducted
in urban environments has raised jus ad bellum proportionality of response by a legitimate
military force. While there have been some attempts to explore qualitatively what
proportionality might look like under these conditions, often it has been representations
made by the media which has informed the debate. Additionally, little empirical research
has been done as to the viability of victory when a military force is restricted in its rules of
engagement -- jus in bello-- because of the changing landscape from a traditional

70 K. Ali, “Slavery and Sexual Ethics in Islam”-Beyond Slavery: Overcoming its Religious and Sexual
Legacies,2010, Palgrave Macmillan U.S, p.108
71 Ibid
72 Assad, Op Cit; Crawford, Op Cit; Fotion, 2006, Op Cit; Fotion, 2007, Op Cit; Gross, Op Cit; Hill, Op
Cit; Kalder, Op Cit; Scharf, Op Cit; Walzer, 2015, Op Cit
73 Both Scharf; and Gross, Op Cit, focused on unresolved legal points and a case study of Operation
Inherent Resolve.
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battlefield to one of an urban theatre. It raises an important area of potentially redefining
what success looks like in a “new war” setting.
Finally, very little attention has been given to the idea of using military interventions
to address aggressive non-state actor groups who are not listed as terrorist or insurgency
organizations.74 Some of these groups not only have extensive military resources, but
their continued existence challenges the Weberian notion that it is the state that holds the
sole monopoly on violence within its sovereign territory. Not only are these groups
inherently violent and threaten the stability of their own state, they also pose serious
national and human security risks to others as well. 75
Current Position of International Law
While the theory itself may be continuing to develop to consider the newer
unconventional aggressors, it is contestable if international law has kept pace to enable
states to address these contemporary security challenges legitimately. The International
Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United States of America (1986) held that collective selfdefense against non-state actor groups located in a third state is not a legitimate reason
to intervene militarily unless there was “a request by the state which regards itself as the
victim of an armed attack.”76 It additionally established the requirement that the non-state

74 Hilary Clinton when U.S Secretary of State stated that “Drug Cartels are showing more and more
indices of insurgencies…the violence in Mexico was beginning to resemble Colombia… where insurgent
groups at one time or another controlled some 40% of the country.” see Clinton says Mexico drug crime
like an insurgency, BBC News, September 9, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada11234058
75 The period of 2008-2011 saw approximately some 30,000 deaths from cartel related activity in Mexico.
Bergal maintains that it fits the criteria for ‘armed conflict’ classification- see C. Bergal, “The Mexican Drug
War: The Case for A Non-International Armed Conflict Classification” 34 Fordham International Law
Journal, 2011, pp.1042-1088
76 Nicaragua v. United States of America (1986) I.C.J 14 at para.199
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group for all intents and purposes, had to be under the control and/or be receiving material
assistance from the state.77 While recognizing that a non-state group could commit an
armed attack, the court limited its interpretation of self-defense as contained within Article
51 of the United Nations Charter, as generally applying only to state versus state
conflicts.78 Although the International Court’s decisions and opinions may provide
direction and evidence of international law, its rulings are only binding on those countries
which agree to submit themselves to its jurisdiction.
The overarching position of the United Nations is that “all Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.”79 The U.N. Charter has numerous sections devoted to the maintenance
of “international peace and security….”80 Chapter VI provides the mechanisms for
peaceful resolutions of disputes including provisions for referral to the International Court,
and/or to the Security Council.81 Chapter VII outlines measures that the Security Council
may authorize with respect to actions that are deemed “threats to peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression.”82 Chapter VIII covers the right of states to participate in
regional arrangements for maintaining peace and security, however no “enforcement
action shall be undertaken … without the authorization of the Security Council.” 83 While

77 Ibid at para.195
78 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory
Opinion), 2004, International Court of Justice, p.62
79 Charter of the United Nations 1945, 2.4
80 Ibid, Preamble
81 Ibid Chapter VI, Articles 33-38
82 Ibid Chapter VII, Articles 39-51
83 Ibid Chapter VIII, Articles 52-54
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the International Court has shown some reluctance to legitimize interventions against
violent-non-state actor organizations, the United Nations Security Council has recognized
that the actions of some of these groups “constitutes one of the most serious threats to
international peace and security….”84
It has also been suggested that since the 1986 ruling, a new norm in customary
international law has developed that recognizes that where a state is “unwilling or unable
to suppress the threat posed by non-state actors operating within its borders” another
state may now legally intervene militarily to address the dangers posed by the VNSA. 85
For this assertion to be valid, it must satisfactorily fulfill the established criteria of ‘what
customary international law is’. The definitions may be found in How is International Law
Made? and The North Sea Continental Shelf Case.86 The International Court of Justice
also defined customary international law as “evidence of a general practice accepted as
law.”87 The Vienna Convention (1969) set out that for a new customary norm to become
international law there must be recognition by “the international community … as a whole
...”88

The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that “[c]ustomary

international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation.”89 The latter requirement -- that state practice is dictated

84 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2249, 20 November 2015, para.1
85 Scharf, Op Cit p.53. As this an interdisciplinary project, “norm” is used in the sense of a required
standard to be reached. In law the term "normative" is used to describe the way something ought to be
done according to a value position.
86 How is International Law Made? 9 Netherlands Y.B Intl.L, at 3,5 (1978); The I.C.J held that “State
practice…should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked” in
The North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Judgement), 1969 I.C.J. 12 at 43.
87 Statute of the International Court of Justice, (1945) Article 38 (1) (b)
88 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Art. 53
89 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 102(2) (1987).
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by a belief the practice is required under international law -- is the principle known as
opinio juris. A practice that states feel free to disregard or not obligated to follow does not
constitute customary law.90
An example of customary international law is the state practice of ensuring
diplomatic immunity. This standard has evolved through consistent and uniform practice
based upon a belief that international law required the protection of diplomatic staff
serving in another country from prosecution under that country’s domestic law. However,
while there is a requirement that the practice is “general and consistent,” it need not be
considered universal.91 Finally, under the principle of jus cogens, “[s]ome rules of
international law are recognized by the international community of states as peremptory,
permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and invalidate international
agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them establishes that there
is no derogation permitted from some international norms and practices, and it takes
precedence over conflicting international agreements and practices.”92 An example of jus
cogens can be illustrated in the U.N. Charter and the prohibition of wars of aggression.93
With regards to self-defense against non-state actor organizations, the
International Court of Justice held that “there is no rule permitting the exercise of collective
self-defense in the absence of a request by the state which regards itself as the victim of
an armed attack … the additional requirement that such a state should declared itself to

90 Ibid
91 Ibid comment c.
92 Ibid comment k.
93 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Art. 1. Additionally, this charter is legally binding upon all
contracting states - almost every state is a member of the United Nations and is therefore legally bound to
the provisions contained within- Art.102.
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have been attacked.”94 Additionally, the court stated: “that no such general right of
intervention exists, in support of an opposition within another state, exists in contemporary
international law.”95 This decision was followed in Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda where the court additionally held that even when consent is obtained “such
operations must be limited and restricted within the parameters of such consent.”96
However, the court left open the issue as to “whether and under what conditions
contemporary international law provides for a right of self-defense against large scale
attacks by irregular forces.”97

94 Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 Op Cit, para.199
95 Ibid, para 209
96 Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, 2005 Op Cit para.52
97 Ibid, para 147
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Part Two: Research Design
Methodology

Walzer, Scharf, and others have previously attempted to answer the research
question from the position of legal arguments and research by way of case studies.98 This
project will take a unique approach in that it will attempt to quantify whether there has
been a consistent application by states to intervene without consent against violent nonstate actor groups in the post-9/11 period. Accordingly, the research design would follow
a semi-quantitative approach and then follow up with an exploratory plausibility probe.
The quantitative data will provide a numerical summary and be used to answer the first
half of the research question
The plausibility probe will then explore three examples of interventions and
examine if they are compatible with Just War Theory. The employment of a plausibility
probe “allows the researcher to sharpen a hypothesis or theory, to refine the
operationalization or measurement of key variables.”99

Additionally it enables the

researcher to determine the feasibility of a research project.100 This approach would
include the use of multiple sources of data including from government defense websites.
This will assist in providing a deeper understanding of the issues and useful in answering
the second half of the research question.

98 Assad, Op Cit; Crawford, Op Cit; Fotion, 2006, Op Cit; Fotion, 2007, Op Cit; Gross, Op Cit; Hill, Op Cit;
Kalder, Op Cit; Scharf, Op Cit; Walzer, 2015, Op Cit
99 J.S Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs and the Logics of Inference” Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 2008, Vol.25, p.6
100 Ibid
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The first stage data would not be overly difficult to obtain as it would be based on
military interventions that occurred from 2001 until 2016–the Global War on Terror. This
specific period was selected because of the evolution of what could be described as the
era of the “uber” terrorist organization; that is, groups that have access to extensive
financial and other resources required to control swathes of territory within a state. In the
follow up exploratory section, the data will shed light on other unexamined state practices
from a normative perspective and if they conform with Just War. The exact details of all
operations, such as personnel numbers and resources, may not be readily available due
to security classifications; however, the data that is available should give a reliable
indication for any future hypothesis formulation and testing.
The collection of data would consist of open source materials, and data sets
obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. The Uppsala project is one of the most
comprehensive databases of organized violence available and has been described as the
“global standard of how conflicts are systematically defined and studied.” 101 This will
provide important foundational information including parties involved, geographical
location, year, etc.102 However, not all variables are available from the Uppsala Dyadic
Dataset, therefore I created a hybrid dataset using additional information from U.N.
Security Council resolutions and votes to determine issues of consent or authorization.
U.N. General Assembly resolution and votes were also examined for evidence of
statements from the international community. Finally, I will obtain information from

101 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) http://pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/about-ucdp/
102 UCDP Dyadic Dataset Version 17.2 http://ucdp.uu.se/
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websites from various national defense departments such as U.S. Department of
Defense, Operation Inherent Resolve, and the Global Coalition Against Daesh.
Definitions and further criteria will be provided from international conventions and
case law, including the U.S. Charter; the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945;
The Vienna Convention 1969; The North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Judgement) 1969;
Nicaragua v. United States of America (Judgement)1986, and Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda - Judgement) 2005.
For this project, interventions will be included on the basis that one of the parties is a nonstate actor group and at least one non-host state actor. “Consent” entails the host state’s
permission to another state to intervene militarily. “Authorization” means an intervention
as approved by the U.N. Security Council. “No consent” means the host state expressly
protests or rejects operations conducted within its sovereign territory.
This project also considers decisions from national jurisdictions, including the U.S.
Supreme Court. Although not considered binding on the International Court of Justice,
legal decisions from national jurisdictions are binding domestically and may be
considered persuasive in future cases heard by the ICJ.
The plausibility probe component of the project explores three examples of the
nature of military interventions since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The first
focuses on the 2001 intervention into Afghanistan, conducted under the self-defense
clause of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The second example centers on the use of armed
unmanned aerial vehicles in Yemen. The third explores the 2014 intervention in Syria,
based upon pre-emptive self-defense, and the “unwilling-and-unable” doctrine.
24

While these interventions may appear prima facie identical, content analysis on
official government documents and statements show some significant differences. Each
example will outline the facts and justification employed as to the right of intervention in
each example. Additionally, the analysis will provide details of how operations were
conducted. Finally, each example will be assessed for its compatibility with Just War
Theory.

Results and Discussion

During the period examined 2001 - 2016, there were military interventions in 15
geographical locations by non-host states against violent non-state actor groups.103 The
criteria for inclusion in this dataset was two-fold. The first criteria for eligibility was two
opposing actors engaged in armed conflict where one of the parties was the government
of a state, although not necessarily the government of the geographical location of the
conflict. The other party to the conflict had characteristics consistent with a VNSA. The
second being that the intervention was consistent with a “boots-on-the-ground”
engagement by a state -- see Figure 1.104 Each intervening state was coded according to
Glelditsch & Ward’s 2013 version of the List of Independent States.105

103 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 17.2, http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/
104 Ibid
105 K.S Gleditsch, & M.D. Ward, Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent
States Since 1816, International Interactions, 1999, Vol.25, pp. 393- 413-updated in 2013; K.S Gleditsch,
& M.D. Ward, System membership case description list, 2007.
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Figure 1-Number of Military Interventions Between 2001-2016

For the purposes of this project a state was defined as either a territory controlled
by a recognized sovereign government or a specific territory under the control of an
“unrecognized government … whose sovereignty is not disputed” by the previously
recognized sovereign government.106 These conditions excluded some interventions that
would otherwise meet the criteria such as those within the Palestinian Territories,
Kurdistan, and Syria, which will be discussed as a separate example in the plausibility
probe later in the paper. Finally, data was excluded on the basis that the intervention was

106 Ibid
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not conducted by either the United States or other countries considered to be allies or
partners of the U.S.
The Uppsala Dyadic Dataset did not include other types of intervention such as air
campaigns by fixed wing aircraft or attacks by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) -- more
commonly known as “drone strikes.” As anticipated, the original dataset did not contain
the consent/non-consent variable. Therefore, I created an additional hybrid dataset using
data obtained from U.N. Security Council resolutions. Information was also obtained from
various websites of governments involved in “boots-on-the-ground” and “train-and-assist”
interventions.
The data showed that 15 states were subject to a military intervention -- see Table
1. The most frequent region for operations was Africa with 12 interventions. There were
two in the Middle East: Iraq and Yemen. Lastly, there was one in Central Asia in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan also had the second highest number of other countries
participating in security operations within its territory -- see Figure 2 below.
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Table 1-Location and Number of States
Participating in Intervention

Geographical

Number of Intervening

Location

States

Afghanistan

50

Algeria

3

Cameroon

1

Central African Republic

3

Democratic Republic of

2

Congo
Iraq

32

Libya

1

Mali

54

Niger

2

Nigeria

3

Rwanda

1

Somalia

10

Sudan

1

Uganda

4

Yemen

10
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Figure 2–Location of Interventions and Number of Intervening States 2001-2016

At its peak, the intervention into Mali saw 54 states participating in the fight against
multiple violent non-state actor organizations including Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and other affiliated groups such as al-Murabitoun and Ansar Dine. The data also
showed that the state most actively involved in supporting interventions was Chad, with
troops deployed to seven locations: Cameroon, Sudan, Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, Mali, and
the Central African Republic. The United States was the second highest intervener with
traditional “boots-on-the-ground” operations in five countries: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya,
and Somalia in addition to Mali.107

107 UDCP Dyadic Dataset Version 17.2
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As the consent and non-consent variables were not included in the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program, I created a hybrid dataset to specifically to show this information.
I defined “consent” as where the intervening state had received express permission from
the legitimate governing entity of the host state or by a resolution from the U.N. Security
Council authorizing military intervention. Fourteen interventions fulfilled these conditions
-- see Figure 3 below. Non-consent was assigned where neither of those two criteria were
met. Yemen was coded as unclear and will be discussed separately in the plausibility
probe section.
There were no clear cases where consent or authorization had not been obtained.
This may in part be explained by a reluctance by the United States and its allies to depart
from the well-established norm of sovereignty except to address imminent and
exceptional security threats. It may also be explained by a willingness of many states to
degrade VNSA activity within their own territory. Additionally, G.W Bush delivered a
speech in which he stated that every nation had a choice to either stand with or against
the United States.108 The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 sent a clear
message for states refusing to cooperate.

108 G.W Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American people, Washington D.C,
September 20, 2001, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109208.html
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Figure 3-Consent Status of Interventions

Additionally, the types of interventions have evolved from the traditional “boots-onthe-ground” approach such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, to a more nuanced strategy of
“temporary deployment” to assist with “peace-keeping forces, building counter-terrorism
capabilities, and the mentoring of partner nation militaries.”109 While it is difficult to keep
a comprehensive record of these operations by the United States, Australia, Canada,
France, the United Kingdom and other key allies, and the joint forces deployed by NATO
and the European Union, these types of missions are becoming increasingly more
common.110 Currently missions are being undertaken in but not limited to Mali, Burkina,
109 A Hunt Friend, What Does Niger Have to Do with the AUMF? Center for Strategic and International
Studies, October 26, 2017 https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-does-niger-have-do-aumf
110 Ibid; Ministerio Defensa de Espana, Misiones en el exterior, March 2018
http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/; Ministère des Armées, March 2018,
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and Niger—see Figure 4 below.111 This list is by no means complete as many of the U.S.
deployments are

simply unknown due to classification status.112 Additionally, total

numbers of U.S. Special Forces deployed have increased from 43,000 in 2001 to about
70,000 in 2017.113
The above figures do not consider U.N. “peace-keeping missions.” While not
strictly a traditional military intervention per se, these U.N.-led operations are comprised
of supporting troops, law enforcement, staff officers, and specialist mission officers. The
principles of these operations are:
1. Consent of the parties
2. Impartiality
3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence (sic) of the mandate.114
It should be noted that while these missions may prima facie appear be identical
to “peace-enforcement missions” sanctioned by the Security Council, the notable

https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/operations/operations/actualites; NATO, Operations Past and
Present, December, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.html ; Australian Department
of Defence : Global Operations, March 2018, http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/ ; Global Coalition
75 Partners United in Defeating Daesh, March 2018, http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners/
111 Missions are also being conducted in: Chad, the Gulf of Guinea, Liberia, Somalia, Senegal, Tunisia,
Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Cameroon, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Kenya, Philippines, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria, Ibid; 2018 Posture Statement to Congress, United States Africa Command,
March 6, 2018 http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/2018-posture-statement-to-congress;
Programs and Initiatives, US Department of State, March 2018, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/
112 Key senators say they didn’t know the US had troops in Niger, CNN Politics, October 23, 2017
https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/23/politics/niger-troops-lawmakers/index.html
113 The New American Way of War, Time, November 30, 2017, http://time.com/5042700/inside-newamerican-way-of-war/
114 Principles of Peace Keeping, United Nations, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-ofpeacekeeping
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difference is that the latter does not require the consent of the state or parties involved.115
As of January 2018, there were some 15 sanctioned operations of this nature.116

Figure 4-Current U.S. Special Forces Deployments by Region 2017

Over 100-member states -- including both China and Russia -- have contributed
91,544 personnel in support of peace-keeping operations; however, in many cases some
countries contributed less than five personnel per mission.117 While some states have low

115 Ibid
116 United Nations Peace Keeping, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en
117 Summary of Contributions to Peacekeeping by Mission, Country and Post, Police, UN Military
Experts on Mission and Troops, 28/02/2018, United Nations,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/5_mission_and_country.pdf,
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participation numbers, nonetheless, it shows an in-principle commitment to peacekeeping efforts by the majority of the international community. When asked about the
role of U.S. forces deployed to missions in Africa, General Thomas D. Waldhauser,
Commander of U.S. Africa Command, stated in recent testimony to Congress:
Security operations are executed almost exclusively by the partnered security
forces. U.S. Africa Command works with partnered security forces based on
their operational needs. The vital objectives of the U.S. and the partnered
nation are achieved through a cooperative relationship in which U.S. Africa
Command plays a supporting role. African leaders tell us how important it is
to develop ‘African solutions to African problems.’118

This demonstrates an increased willingness to work in concert with and support the host
state forces as opposed to earlier interventions that removed regimes such as the Taliban
in Afghanistan.

118 Gen T.D Waldhauser, Ibid,
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Part Three: Plausibility Probe

The purpose of the plausibility probe was to determine the feasibility of conducting
an in-depth study into the research area. It was also employed to assist in answering the
second part of the research question—the types of military interventions by the United
States and allies against VNSAs such as terrorists and insurgents. The examples chosen
for their prima facie similarity were Afghanistan, Yemen, and Syria. These examples are
not full case studies but rather a synopsis of each military intervention.
The three examples included the type and intensity of response by the United
States, and/or by its allies and partners, and the international community’s reaction
through relevant Security Council resolution and other applicable statements. Each
intervention was also analyzed for compatibility with International Court of Justice rulings,
as one of the sources of international law. Finally, each was evaluated in accordance with
adherence to Just War principles by the intervening state. The implications of the findings
are reported in a separate section immediately following the final example.

Afghanistan

On September 11, 2001 VSNA organization Al Qaida attacked the United States
murdering some 3,000 people after previous incidents both within the U.S. and on its
interests overseas. The U.S. immediately declared that Al Qaida’s acts were consistent
with the International Court of Justice’s definition of “an armed attack” by a non-state actor
group that triggered a right to self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. While
35

previously Article 51 had only been thought to be applicable to attacks by other states,
there was little disagreement from the international community that in this instance, a nonstate actor group could have the same capacity to inflict catastrophic damage as a state.
On September 12, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368 which
stated:

Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks
which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and
Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as
a threat to international peace and security.119

The Security Council also called for the perpetrators, sponsors, and organizers to
be held accountable for their acts.120 The Council reiterated that it was prepared to take
“all necessary steps….” to ensure justice was “seen to be done.”121

In response to the attacks the U.S. issued the following statement:

The United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban:
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in
your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have
unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in
119 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1368, September 12, 2001, para.1
https://undocs.org/S/RES/1368(2001)
120 Ibid, para.3
121 Ibid, para.5
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your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp
in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support
structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to
terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.
These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must
act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share
in their fate. 122

On October 7, 2001, the United States commenced military operations in
Afghanistan in response to the attacks known as Operation Enduring Freedom. Under
both Regular and Irregular Just War Theory, the United States was entitled to pursue Al
Qaida with a military response in self-defense and to prevent further attacks. The Taliban
Government in Afghanistan provided a safe-haven, permitted Al Qaida to operate training
camps within its sovereign territory, and refused to hand over key organizational figures.
As Afghanistan is a state, Regular Just War Theory was applicable. Additionally, applying
the “but-for test”; i.e., but for Al Qaida’s presence and safe-haven in Afghanistan, it is
extremely unlikely there would have been an invasion into Afghanistan. Once the Taliban
government had been removed by traditional military methods, the U.S. then set about
assisting with traditional “peace after war” re-building the state while still being able to
legitimately pursue leaders of Al Qaida.123

122 G.W Bush, Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress, Washington D.C, September 20th,
2001, pp.67-68,
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_Georg
e_W_Bush.pdf
123 Fotion, 2006 Op Cit
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The covert action and assassination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan is considered
‘just’ under Irregular Just War Theory as bin Laden still fulfilled the criteria of an “imminent
and ongoing threat” to the United States. Pakistan claimed to have had no prior
knowledge of bin Laden’s location within its territory. While there may have been some
international criticism for the brief infringement of sovereignty, covert action informed by
Irregular Just War Theory was no doubt preferable to the alternative, i.e., airstrikes on the
compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Additionally, the covert operation could be denied
had it not been successful in its objectives -- the capture or killing of bin Laden.
Since the death of bin Laden, the United States and allies’ role in Afghanistan has
evolved. What commenced as a traditional military intervention has subsequently become
a mission to stabilize the country. This includes “train, assist, and support” operations to
strengthen Afghanistan’s capacity to provide security for itself against various VNSA
organizations such as the Taliban. It is note-worthy that at the time of writing of this paper,
this has been the longest military conflict deployment by the United States since
Vietnam—some 17 years.
Republic of Yemen
Although Yemen satisfied the criteria for inclusion in the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program, it presents as an interesting example because of its complexity. Historically, the
government had been engaged in combatting an ongoing insurgency against the northern
Yemeni (mostly) Shi’a Houthi tribes since about 2004. The government claimed that the
Houthis wanted to overthrow the elected regime and impose Shar’iah law. The Houthis

38

counter-claimed they were being targeted by discrimination and overly “aggressive acts
by the Yemeni government.” 124
Additionally, Al Qaida groups in Saudi Arabia and Yemen merged in late
2008/2009 to create Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).125 After President Salah’s
release of 176 suspected Al Qaida fighters in early 2009, the Houthi claimed that the
government was using the terrorist group to fight Houthi insurgents.

126

What initially

started as a local uprising between the Houthis, government forces and Sunni extremists
has since escalated into civil war; however, other states did not become militarily involved
in Yemen until late 2009 when Saudi Arabia deployed military forces and equipment in
response to border attacks by Houthi fighters. By December of 2009, Armed Conflicts
Report claimed that the death toll had reached 236 Houthi fighters, 119 Yemeni
government forces, and 82 (later revised to 133) Saudi personnel.127 Almost 300 civilians
were also killed during this period.128
As part of the Global War on Terror, the United States also launched missile strikes
in late 2009, allegedly against Al Qaida; however the Houthis claimed that these attacks
had not targeted terrorists but instead killed 63 civilians including 28 children.129 At the
124 Deadly blast strikes Yemen mosque, BBC News, May 2, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7379929.stm
125 Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University,
https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/19#note6
126 Yemen’s Forever War: The Houthi Rebellion, Washington Institute, July 10, 2010,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/yemens-forever-war-the-houthi-rebellion
127 Armed Conflicts Report – Yemen, Plough Shares, updated 2009,
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-Yemen.htm; Saudi Arabia says soldiers killed in
Yemen, Press TV, January 12, 2010
128 Armed Conflicts Report -Yemen Op Cit
129 Obama Ordered Missile Strikes on Yemeni Terrorists, ABC News, December 18, 2009.
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cruise-missiles-strike-yemen/story?id=9375236&page=1; US air raid kills
63 civilians in Yemen, Press TV, December 18, 2009
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same time Saudi ground forces continued to advance in Sa’dah. 130 While a cease-fire
was brokered between the Yemeni government and the Houthis in early January 2010
by the end of the month the cease fire had collapsed with a resumption of fighting on all
sides. The United States proceeded to launch armed drone strikes against suspected Al
Qaida targets. Numerous international humanitarian non-governmental organizations
condemned these strikes as covert operations being driven by the Central Intelligence
Agency (C.I.A.) and, as such, were not subject to accountability or proper congressional
oversight. 131
It is estimated that between 2001-2011 there were 12-15 confirmed, another 1012 possible strikes with between 36-41 alleged civilian deaths.132 In 2012, the number of
strikes exponentially increased to 29-36 confirmed, 54-70 possible strikes with 7-34
alleged civilian deaths. 133 The data for 2013 shows 22 confirmed, 10-11 possible strikes
with the alleged civilian death toll between 17-37.134 In 2014, there were 13-15 confirmed,
another 18 possible strikes with an alleged civilian death toll of between 4-22.135

130 Saudi air strike kills Yemen rebels as US drawn into fight, Christian Science Monitor, December 21,
2009, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2009/1221/Saudi-air-strike-kills-Yemen-rebelsas-US-drawn-into-fight
131 CIA Plans Yemen Drone Strikes, The Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2011,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303848104576384051572679110; U.S Relaxes Drone
Rules, The Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2012,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304723304577366251852418174
132 Yemen: Reported US Covert Actions 2001-2011, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2001-2011
133 Yemen: Reported US Covert Action 2012, Ibid, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/dronewar/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-action-2012
134 Yemen: Reported US Covert Action 2013, Ibid, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/dronewar/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2013
135 Yemen: Reported US Covert Action 2014, Ibid, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/dronewar/data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2014
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Numerous scholars and institutions, including the United Nations, have argued that
targeted drone strikes as a counter-terrorism strategy violate international law.136 Brooks
did not see the strikes as a strict violation per se but more as a challenge to international
law because it “defy[s] straightforward legal categorization.”137 Millson and Herman
suggested that legality depended on the circumstances of the strike and whether other
obligations under Just War had been satisfied.138 Drone strikes also raised questions of
the violation of the sovereignty norm -- if only even briefly -- of states who had not given
their consent or protest U.S. drones operating within their territorial airspace.
An additional issue was raised after the strikes of September and October 2011
respectively, targeted and killed U.S. citizens Anwar al-Awlaki, his teenage son,
Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, and Samir Khan.139 These specific drone strikes raised questions
about the legality of extra-judicial execution of U.S. citizens by the United States without
due process. In April 2013, the U.S. Appeals Court ordered the Obama administration to
release a Justice Department memorandum outlining the government’s legal rationale for
the drone strikes. The document concluded that “wartime legal authority to target enemies
extends to Yemen given the circumstances of Al Qaida activities there.” 140

136 M. Boyle, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare” International Affairs, 2013, Vol.89 No.1;
M. Sterio, “The United States’ Use of Drones in The War on Terror: The (Il)Legality of Targeted Killings
Under International Law”, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 2012 Vol.45
137 R. Brooks, “Drones and the International Rule of Law” Ethics and International Affairs,2014, Vol.28
No.1, p.83
138 R. Millson and D Herman, Killing by Drones: Legality Under International Law, The Foundation for
Law, Justice and Society, 2015, Oxford University
139 Memo on Drone Strikes Draws Scrutiny, The Wall Street Journal, February 05, 2013
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324900204578286432096035960.html
140 New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 756 bF.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014); See also Court Releases
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While the memorandum may have satisfied the requirement of U.S. domestic law,
it also raised an important legal issue regarding the role and status of U.S. military
involvement in Yemen. As Pejic and Gabor asserted:
In an armed conflict, in the zone of hostilities, combatants may be targeted
without warning or detained without trial. Such treatment is unlawful against
persons engaging in violence in the absence of armed conflict.141
If the U.S. was engaged in an armed conflict in Yemen, then Just War principles of
proportionality and discrimination were applicable for its involvement to be considered
rightful conduct i.e. that civilians were not to be targeted and that excessive harm was to
be avoided while legitimate objectives were targeted. If the U.S. claimed it was not
engaged in an armed conflict, then the strikes may be considered as an illegitimate use
of force unless consent had been obtained. While the U.S may have been tempted to cite
the “unwilling or unable” doctrine to justify its operations, for reasons that will be discussed
later, it may be legally ‘shaky ground’. The United States has continued to maintain a
small contingent of special forces as well as a C.I.A. presence in Yemen in response to
increased instability and ongoing violent non-state actor organizations such as AQAP and
the Islamic State (ISIL) group.142 Additionally, the “United States forces, in a non-combat

141 Pejic 2005 and Gabor 2005 in M O’Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, University of
Richmond Law Review, Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper, No. 08-39, January 2009 , p.119
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1332096
142 The End of Al Qaida, Time, September 17, 2012,
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2123810,00.html
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role, have also continued to provide logistics and other support to regional forces
combatting the Houthi insurgency in Yemen.”143
After 2011-2012 Arab Spring uprising, the United States has not been the only
country to continue to keep a military presence in Yemen. Saudi Arabia and a coalition of
nine other Middle Eastern and African states including the United Arab Emirates, Jordon,
Senegal, and Morocco have also increased their military capacity with both airstrikes and
ground forces. This was in response to the successful Iranian supported Houthi coup in
Sana’a, the subsequent take-over of the presidential palace, and the installation of a
government led by Mohammad al-Houthi on February 6, 2015.144 President Hadi, who
was forced to flee Yemen, sent a letter to the Gulf Cooperation Council on March 24 th,
2017 requesting military intervention -- despite being in exile. As most of the international
community considered Hadi as the rightful authority, the request and subsequently
consent were legitimate. This is important because consent can only be given by the
legitimate authority of a state. Citing Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Charter
of the League of Arab States, and Treaty on Joint Defence, Hadi asked that international
forces be sent “to protect Yemen and its people from Houthi aggression ... Al Qaida and
[the] Islamic State…”145 This has resulted in a continuing sectarian conflict between Shi’a

143 Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
Pro Tempore of the Senate, December 11, 2017 in Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention,
Congressional Research Service, February 07, 2018, p.8 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf
144 Shia rebels finalize takeover of Yemen, dissolve parliament, The Globe and Mail, February 6, 2015,
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/yemens-shia-rebels-finalize-coup-vow-to-dissolveparliament/article22829401/; Senegal to support Yemen campaign, BBC News, May 5, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32586230
145 United Nations Security Council, S/ 2015/217, March 27, 2017 in Yemen: Civil War and Regional
Intervention, Op Cit, p.5
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and Sunni forces with external actors from other countries in what has now been referred
to as a “chaos state.”146

United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Yemen

In April 2015, the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 2216 demanded that:
… the Houthis, withdraw from all areas seized during the latest conflict,
relinquish arms seized from military and security institutions, cease all actions
falling exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen
and fully implement previous Council resolutions…,also called upon the
Houthis to refrain from any provocations or threats to neighbouring (sic)
States, release the Minister for Defence, all political prisoners and individuals
under house arrest or arbitrarily detained, and end the recruitment of
children.147
In addition, the Council also called upon member states to implement and take “necessary
measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, transfer” of weapons to the
Houthis. It also mandated for financial sanctions against the leaders of the regime.148

146 P. Salisbury, “Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg”, Chatham House, March 2018, p.5
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2018-03-27-yemensouthern-powder-keg-salisbury-final.pdf
147 Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian
Federation Abstaining, United Nations Meetings and Press Releases, April 14, 2015,
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm
148 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216, S/RES/2216 (2015) pp.5-6
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2216.pdf
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While the resolution was strongly worded, it did not give specific authorization for
military enforcement or the use of force by Saudi Arabia or any other state against the
Houthis; however, this does not preclude a state acting in self-defense in accordance with
Article 51 in the event of an armed attack on it by the Houthi regime.149 The Council also
noted that the deteriorating political and security conditions was conducive to a potential
resurgence of AQAP, further complicating the environment.150
From a humanitarian perspective the ongoing civil conflict and the blockade of
Yemen continues to adversely affect the civilian population. Food insecurity has caused
a famine and “1.3 million Yemeni children were acutely malnourished…17.8 million
Yemenis were struggling to find enough food, and 21.2 million Yemenis were in need of
humanitarian assistance”

151

There is also an acute shortage of medicines and medical

supplies, and wide-spread outbreaks of cholera and diphtheria.152 It is hard to envisage
that this is the “good or avoidance of evil” that Aquinas and other Just War scholars
advocated and could be seen as being a form of collective punishment.

Syrian Arab Republic
The 2014 military intervention in Syria, presented an interesting example for
several reasons. Firstly, the nature of the conflict could be initially classified as a civil war

149 The United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51 http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chaptervii/
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that evolved exponentially to include numerous violent non-state actor organizations such
as the Islamic State and Hezbollah. Secondly, the number of various non-state actor
groups involved including those in opposition to the regime, and to each other made for
an extremely complex situation. Finally, the legal status of the initial intervention by the
U.S. and other partner states remains unresolved and has global security implications.
Nobody in late 2010 could have predicted that a self-immolation of a fruit vendor
in Tunisia would spark a wave of protests and uprisings in the Middle East and North
African (MENA) region that would become known as the “Arab Spring.” The Jasmine
Revolution of Tunisia rapidly spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. Dictators
were removed in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya while mounting protests also became
increasingly violent in Syria. In March 2011, demonstrators in Damascus were fired upon
by security forces of the regime. What had started out as a protest demanding political
and economic reforms quickly escalated to calls for the regime to be removed from power.
By June 2011, it was estimated that thousands of protestors had been detained. News
reports indicated that approximately 1000 civilians, and 150 police and soldiers had also
been killed.
The next phase of the conflict was the beginning of an armed insurgency by armed
militias, and the creation of the Free Syrian Army in July 2011. It comprised of officers
and former armed forces members who had defected from the Syrian Army. The group’s
objective was to overthrow the government led by Bashar al Assad. Assad responded in
an address to the Syrian parliament that the violence had been instigated by “outside
conspirators, and the influence of foreign states” spreading misinformation and
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propaganda.153 While the United Nations and the Arab League attempted to broker
peace, the violence quickly took on the characteristics of a civil war.
Despite numerous attempts to implement ceasefires during the first half of 2012,
the violence continued, and in June of that year, the United Nations and the International
Committee of the Red Cross proclaimed Syria to be in a “state of civil war.” The violence
at this point was predominantly centered in the cities of Aleppo and the capital Damascus.
By January 2013 the violence had expanded to other areas and the armed Islamist group
Jabhat al Nusra (a.k.a. Al Qaida in Syria) had entered the conflict. Kurdish YPG forces
were increasingly engaged in fighting against both rebel and government forces. By April,
the Shi’a group Hezbollah had also entered the conflict on the side of the Syrian regime.
During this period reports emerged that the Syrian regime forces had allegedly used
chemical weapons within the conflict, leading to calls for the Syrian government to be
disarmed of all chemical weapons.
During late 2013, the Islamic State organization had exploited the conflict with the
intention of expanding its Islamic caliphate. ISIL captured the city of Raqqa from the Free
Syrian Army, the Army of the Mujahideen, and Islamic Front in January of 2014, and later
proclaimed it to be the capital of their caliphate. The group also seized the Shaar oilfield.
Additionally, the Turkish air force also became involved and launched airstrikes against
convoys of the Islamic State group on the border with Aleppo.

153 Assad blames conspirators for Syrian protests, The Guardian, 30th March, 2011
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/30/syrian-protests-assad-blames-conspirators
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Meanwhile in June 2014, elections were conducted within government-held
territories. For the first time in Syrian elections there were multiple presidential
candidates. According to the Supreme Constitutional Court of Syria, 11.63 million Syrians
voted (voter participation was 73.42%). Bashar al-Assad retained the presidency with
88.7% of the votes. Assad’s challengers, Hassan al-Nouri received 4.3% of the votes,
and Maher Hajjar received 3.2%.154 Representatives from more than 30 countries were
invited by Assad and the Syrian government to follow the election process, including
representatives from Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, Russia,
South Africa, and Venezuela. In a statement on behalf of the group, Iranian official
Alaeddin Boroujerdi said the election was “free, fair and transparent.”155 The United
States, the European Union, and the Gulf Cooperation Council dismissed the results of
the election and viewed the process as both illegitimate and a farce.
On September 23, 2014 the United States entered the conflict in Syria deploying
missiles launched from a destroyer located in the Red Sea, bombers and fighter jets
launched from the USS George H.W Bush, and Predator drones against various targets
around the Islamic State stronghold of Raqqa. The Syrian representative to the United
Nations, had been informed by the United States of the impending strikes. Other countries
that participated included Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. On the same day, Israel shot down a Syrian fighter jet after it
entered airspace over the Golan Heights territory. The United States also commenced

154 Supreme Constitutional Court: Number of participants in Presidential election reached 11,634,412
with 73.42%, Sana. English, June 4, 2014
155 International observers say Syrian elections were transparent, LaInfo.es, June 4, 2014
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supplying weapons and other resources to various opposition groups including the Free
Syrian Army.
Fighting between the various forces and factions continued, and in 2015, U.S.
Special Forces led a raid that uncovered evidence that tied Turkish governmental officials
to high ranking ISIL members. Australia joined the U.S. led coalition and commenced
airstrikes against the Islamic State as an extension of its Iraq mission. The U.S. continued
weapon supplies to various opposition groups, Kurdish Peshmerga, and YPG forces
fighting for control of Kobani. The U.S. additionally announced that it would “allow air
strikes to help defend against any attack on the U.S. trained Syrian rebels, even if the
attackers come from forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.”156
The next major development was at the request of the Syrian government, Russia
deployed military forces to intervene in September 2015. This consisted of fighter jets,
ground personnel and naval ships in support of the regime and the Syrian Defence Force.
By this point Iran had also entered the conflict on the side of Assad with military advisors
and the Republican Guard. This is by no means a complete listing of all the various groups
and militias involved in the conflict. It highlights the complexities and numerous opposing
forces to both the regime, and in many instances on the “opposition” side, to each other.
By the end of 2015 some ten states had militarily intervened in some capacity in Syria,
but not all did so initially with consent or authorization.157 At the time of writing this paper,

156 Anon U.S Official, 2015
157 These countries included: The United States, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Qatar. Others such as Australia, the United Kingdom and France
commenced operations only after the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249 in November of
2015.
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the Islamic State group had lost almost all their previous territory within both Iraq and
Syria.158
While the Syrian conflict did not meet the initial criteria for inclusion in the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program because of the definitions mentioned above, the United States and
some of its regional partners militarily intervened in Syria. The intervention against the
Islamic State and other non-state actor organizations was conducted by both air strikes
and missiles launched from various U.S. naval assets. Although the Syrian government
was informed of the U.S’ intention, it did not give express consent for the operation, nor
at that time had authorization been obtained from the U.N. Security Council. Furthermore,
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter limits interventions to self-defense.159
It is difficult to ascertain how the initial intervention was legitimate given that the
United States itself had not declared that it had a suffered an attack nor in imminent threat
of being attacked by the Islamic State group.160 The intervening countries may well have
declared the Syrian regime “unwilling or unable” to combat the violent non-state actor
organizations within its territory to provide a justification for the intervention. Assuredly,
this claim loses its creditability once the Russian Federation and Iran militarily intervened
with the consent of Syria.161 Additionally, not all other states fully agreed with the United
States and some of its allies’ assessment of both unwilling and unable components of the

158 Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps, BBC World News, March 28th, 2018,
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50

doctrine. Instead they relied upon the fact the Syrian government “does not at this time
exercise effective control.”162
Other states asserted that that there has not been consistent state practice that
identified the “unwilling or unable doctrine” as a legitimate international norm.163 The
United Kingdom stated that the “nebulous parameters of the doctrine make measuring
State practice challenging, and consensus of clear State practice (besides the acts of the
U.S.) is fleeting.”164 Additionally, it has been suggested that that the “introduction of
‘unwilling or unable’ terminology . . . when justifying action on a nation’s territory without
its permission. . . does not meet a threshold test for rigor or legitimacy in the law of armed
conflict.”165 Finally, Gross asserted that the “unwilling or unable doctrine” is not the current
state of law…”166
United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Syria
The chief responsibility of the Security Council under the United Nations Charter
is the “maintenance of international peace and security.”167 It is comprised of five
permanent members: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and
10 non-permanent members who serve a term upon election by the members of the

162 Letter sent by Germany to the President of the Security Council, December 10, 2015 in Gross, Op
Cit, p.29
163 Norway, Denmark, and France only acted on a request from the government of Iraq, in Gross Ibid,
pp.29-30
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General Assembly.168 All elected member states of the council have a vote, but only the
permanent five have the power of veto, which if wielded, results in the rejection of the
proposed resolution.169 The Council may vote on any number of measures including the
authorizing of military interventions against a state under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter. There has been some debate about the effectiveness of the Security
Council given the power of veto of the permanent five, but it is beyond the scope of this
project to discuss this issue in detail, other than to say many lives may have been saved
had the Council originally been given a mandate to authorize by majority rather than the
requirement of a unanimous decision.
The position of the U.N. Security Council regarding the conflict in Syria, has at best
been mixed. Fourteen resolutions establishing observer missions, cease fires, and those
calling for access for humanitarian workers and aid have passed unanimously since mid2012; however, several other resolutions that included language such as “referral to the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court”, “imposition of measures under Article 41,”
and other intervention actions were the subject of either a sole veto by Russia, or dual
veto’s by both China and Russia.170 The reasons China and Russia have given have
ranged from “non-acceptability of military intervention”, the assigning of blame before
independent investigation, and the strong reiteration of “respect for sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity….”171 China has had a consistent policy of not

168 Ibid art. 23.1
169 Ibid art. 27
170 Approved resolutions: S/2012/2014; S/2012/2043; S/2012/2059; S/2013/2118; S/2014/2139;
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S/2016/2336 and S/2018/2401. Not approved draft resolutions: S/2011/612; S/2012/77; S/2012/538;
S/2014/348; S/2016/846; S/2016/1026 and S/2017/315
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supporting resolutions that may lead to military interventions as it is a staunch supporter
of the norms of sovereignty and non-interference; however, given Russia’s alliance with
Syria, the Russian veto may be more politically motivated than based upon principle.
While the Security Council may have been paralyzed with regards to implementing
a military intervention strategy regarding the civil war in Syria, it did pass Resolution 2249
on November 20, 2015, regarding the Islamic State group in which it declared:

The Security Council….Calls upon Members States that have the capacity to
do so to take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law
(emphasis added), in particular with the United Nations Charter, as well
as…humanitarian law, on the territory under the control of ISIL, also known as
Da’esh, in Iraq and Syria, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent
and suppress terrorist acts committed by ISIL… and other terrorist
groups…and to eradicate the safe haven they have established over
significant parts of Iraq and Syria;…172

The language used in this resolution was specifically directed at the violent nonstate actor groups in Syria. It gave no authorization for the use of force against the Syrian
regime itself or its security apparatus. Furthermore, the resolution reiterated that all
measures undertaken by participating member states were to be conducted “in
compliance with international law.”173 This language may be interpreted that any military

172 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2249, 2015
173 Ibid
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operations other than those specifically directed at the Islamic State and associated
terrorist organizations including against the Syrian regime were “unlawful,” particularly in
light of the International Court of Justice ruling in Nicaragua v. United States.174 .

Implications
From a scholarly perspective, this research demonstrated that Just War Theory is
still relevant to modern warfare. It is an enduring moral compass for those engaged in
armed conflict. The United States, its allies, and the international community continue to
address security threats from a position that is mostly compatible with the theory. Just
War principles have evolved from initially addressing interstate violence to application in
combatting violent non-state actor groups such as terrorists and insurgents.
While the jus ad bellum (just cause) component may sometimes be questionable;
the way in which these interventions were conducted, they were almost always
compatible with jus in bello (rightful conduct within war). Just because a state engages in
a conflict that may not be considered a “just” or legitimate intervention, that does not
absolve the military force from conducting the campaign with a complete disregard for
well-established law and the rules of war. The adherence to the principle of discrimination
in that civilians and other protected entities are not to be deliberately targeted is

174 Nicaragua v. United States, 1986, Op Cit. para: 109; 209. As mentioned above, the Court found that
there was neither a collective right to self-defense against non-state actor groups unless requested by the
attacked state, nor was there a “general right of intervention …, in support of an opposition within another
state, [under] contemporary international law.”
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paramount. Additionally, the notion of proportionality of action taken must be in proportion
to the wrong suffered or “to the possible good that may come.”175 As Walzer has stated:

No group of soldiers claiming, to be just warriors, can arrogate to themselves
rights they deny to others or claim exemption from everyone else’s obligation
-- for if that is allowed and justified, there will soon be no constraints at all.176

That all member states of the United Nations have signed and ratified a codified version
of jus in bello in the four Geneva Conventions, demonstrates a universal morality among
the members of the international community that certain behaviors are unacceptable.177
In answer to Plato’s question on who gets to decide the morality -- the right or wrong of
conduct in conflict -- in this case it is the international community of states. Whether all
states comply with their legal obligations is also important. Non-compliance has the
potential to undermine established norms and weaken the rule of law, such as the
prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. This is another area for potential
investigation.
Just War Theory is particularly useful in that it assists us to “understand the
wrongfulness of terrorism” in that it deliberately targets civilians as a matter of choice.178
Successful asymmetric conflicts including insurgencies have been conducted without the
targeting of civilians. Indeed, many guerilla style campaigns are successful because of
175 Hill, 2010 Op Cit, p.79
176 Walzer 2015 Op Cit, p.346
177 The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) specifically deals with humanitarian protections for civilians in
a war zone, http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.33_GC-IV-EN.pdf
178 Walzer, 2006, Op Cit, p.3
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the support of the civilian populace. It also casts doubt on the validity of the cliché that
“one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” - the deliberate targeting of civilians
is always morally and ethically repugnant.
Kantian philosophy can additionally be considered an extension of the theory in
that all peoples also belong to an international moral community where there is a respect
for the fundamental rights of all. It posits that both human and moral progress can only
be achieved in a society based on laws. Modern cosmopolitans support some types of
military interventions because “the moral obligation to assist arises on the part of all of
those able to help … irrespective of whether they are in any way responsible for the
human misery.”179 It is also premised on the ideas of a common humanity and a shared
human dignity.180 Moreover, it advances the notion that both human and moral progress
can only be achieved in a community based on laws. This extends to include current
international law regardless of its deficiencies.181
The results of the research lend support to the philosophical concept of
deontological ethics as opposed to utilitarianism. While the latter is premised on the ends
justifying the means, deontological ethics places a greater emphasis on the way that an
objective is achieved.182 A Kantian approach to VNSAs also implies that states would
approve of others adopting similar security strategies. The train and assist missions can

179 R. Eckersley, “From Cosmopolitan Nationalism to Cosmopolitan Democracy”, Review of International
Studies, 2007, Vol.33, p.679
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be interpreted as being compatible to Kantian thought as it is ethically means focused. In
contrast, interventions without consent could be viewed as more likely to fulfil “the ends
justifying the means” of utilitarianism.
Although this project focused on terrorist organizations and insurgencies, some
other violent non-state actor groups also have the resources and financial capacity to
destabilize the security environment, such as drug cartels. If military interventions are
permitted to be conducted without consent or authorization against one type of violent
non-state actors, there is a hypothetical case for extending this to include all types of
VNSAs irrespective of motivation - be it political or financial. As the current research did
not demonstrate evidence of a growing norm for interventions on this basis, interventions
without consent have the potential to be a dangerous precedent if adopted to address
other VNSA activities. While the threat threshold would need to be considerably higher, it
is not beyond the realm of possibility that any state could be declared “unwilling or unable”
to act. This is an area for potential investigation, for example, what is the threshold of
violence required for an intervention against a major drug cartel?
Increased cooperation between intervening and host states presents as an
alternative strategy to combatting VNSAs. It is also compatible with the Just War principle
of “the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.”183 It shifts the intervening state’s
role from that of a traditional combat mission to one that predominantly focuses on training
local forces. There is a greater emphasis on support and mentoring rather than
militarization. The feasibility of this approach could also benefit from further investigation,

183 Aquinas Op Cit
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particularly with the public’s general wariness of ongoing global military engagements and
war fatigue.
As the intervening state’s forces are trainers and mentors rather than fighters per
se, there is a greater opportunity to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population. It
reduces the violent non-state actor from using the intervention as a potential recruiting
tool based on propaganda messaging.

Finally, with the additional responsibilities

associated with conducting missions in an urbanized setting, Glenn asserted that a
foreign military might find itself “better placed in a supporting rather than leading role
particularly if a host government is in place and functioning effectively.” 184
As the War on Terror is almost two decades in and showing no signs of ending
any time soon it is critical that resources and personnel are not over stretched. Since 9/11
the United States has spent at least $5.6 trillion in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, and Iraq.
This figure does not include other counter-terror related missions being undertaken
elsewhere.185 From a policy perspective, train and assist operations may be more
financially sustainable over a longer duration as opposed to the costs associated with
long traditional military engagements. This too is an area that could benefit from further
investigation.

184 R. Glenn, Mega Cities: The Time is Nigh, Mad Scientist Laboratory-Forecasting the Future of War,
March 29, 2018, http://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/
185 Costs of War: The $5.6 Trillion Price Tag of the post 9 / 11 Wars, Watson Institute International and
Public Affairs, November 2017
http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2017/Summary%2C%20Budgetary%20Costs%
20of%20Post%209.11%20Wars.pdf
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Part Four: Conclusion

This research project has examined the United States and its allies’ responses to
violent non-state actor organizations in other states since the commencement of the
Global War on Terror. Data was collected on the period from January 2001 until January
2016. During this time there have been 15 military interventions into other states with all
but one being by clear cases of consent by the host state, or authorization under Chapter
VII by the United Nations Security Council. The range of states intervening into one state
was fifty-four at a maximum, however three quarters of these interventions consisted of
less than five states participating.
Types and intensity of responses by intervening states also varied during this time.
In 2001 the response to Al Qaida Afghanistan, could be considered a traditional “bootson-the-ground” campaign supported by missile and air strikes. In Yemen the approach
was more nuanced to consist of only air and missile strikes, mostly conducted by drones.
It was difficult to get official data on the exact details as many of the drone strikes were
covert operations and remain classified. Other allied states including the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia have also intervened in Yemen with traditional ground forces in addition to
conducting their own airstrikes.
The data also demonstrated a substantial number of ‘train, assist and support’
missions, mostly conducted within the MENA region. Again, these operations were
conducted with the consent of the host nation or under the authorization of the Security
Council. The United States has almost doubled the number of its Special Forces
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operations since the early 2000s; however, acquiring exact numbers, locations and
specific missions proved difficult to obtain as many remain classified.
The interventions were also examined for their compatibility with Just War
principles. While most were found to be jus ad bellum -- just cause -- there are some that
where the legitimacy of the initial intervention is questionable, specifically Syria. Neither
consent from the Syrian government had been obtained, nor had the Security Council
authorized the use of military force. Although the Council did eventually issue a resolution
of authorization retrospectively some 12 months later, the language contained within was
very precise in that only certain terrorist organizations could be targeted. It also
highlighted that all action taken was to specifically follow international law.
The International Court of Justice -- as one source of international law -- has
expressly stated in Nicaragua v. United States under what circumstances a military
intervention into another state to target VNSAs can be considered legitimate. The Court’s
ruling was made in 1986, however, and it can be argued that it did not contemplate that
a non-state actor group could present as an equal threat to a state as another state could.
As with any court, the International Court of Justice can only issue a ruling or an advisory
opinion when a case is before it. Perhaps now is the time for the Court to consider the
new types of security challenges presented by well-resourced violent non-state actor
groups. It would also be an opportunity for the Court to align its position with that of the
Security Council.
Irrespective of whether an intervention is considered legitimate, how an intervening
military force conducts its operations -- jus in bello -- is equally important from both a
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moral and legal stance. The principles of how war is to be conducted places special
emphasis on proportionality of response and discrimination in targeting. Under no
circumstances is it permissible to deliberately target civilians who may be caught up in
the conflict. Violent non-state actors who deliberately target civilians as a strategy of
choice are morally and legally reprehensible both from a Just War perspective, and under
international law. This prohibition has also been codified by the Fourth Geneva
Convention and signed by every U.N. member state. The additional Protocols set out in
detail jus in bello requirements although not all countries including the U.S. are
signatories.
While this paper focused predominantly on terrorist and other insurgency
movements, there are other violent non-state actors who pose an equal security risk both
domestically and globally. These include highly militarized drug cartels, gangs, and other
transnational organized crime networks. Due to time limitations these groups could not
be considered in any detail. This is an area worthy of further research, particularly
regarding potential future military interventions in other states.
Finally, this paper has sought to answer whether there had been a development
of new international norms relating to military interventions. While there has been an
increase in non-traditional ‘train and assist’ missions, there is no legal obligation for states
to participate in these types of operations. Nor has any new norm been established
regarding intervening without consent under the “unwilling or unable” doctrine. It is not
currently international law as there has been no consistent practice by a significant
number of states. However, that is not to say that it won’t become a new norm at some
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point in the future particularly if violent non-state actor groups continue to proliferate in
fragile states.
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